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I. INTRODUCTION 
International commercial arbitration is a settlement of dispute which is based on the agreement1 of the 
parties and a contract by the authority of arbitrators.2 In other words, arbitration is a process and a 
consensual agreement between parties who submit a dispute to a non-governmental decision-maker, 
selected by or for the parties, ostensibly provides for a neutral, private and efficient forum to resolve 
their disputes.3 Furthermore, arbitration provides neither the procedural protections nor the assurance 
of the proper application of substantive law offered by the judicial system and facilitate the enforcement 
                                                          
1 The first international agreement on the legal and procedural order of international commercial arbitration was the Protocol of 
Geneva in 1923. The Geneva negotiations purposed to introduce arbitration as an alternative dispute solving mechanism. The 
protocol was ratified only 24 states. 
2 Peter Behrens, ‘’ Arbitration as an Instrument of Conflict Resolution in International Trade: Its Basis and Limits’’  (1993) Baden- 
Baden, 14  
3 Ronan Feebily, 'Neutrality, Independence and Impartiality in International Commercial Arbitration, a Fine Balance in the Quest 
for Arbitral Justice' (2019) 7(1) PENN ST JL & INT'L AFF 88, 89 
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of arbitration award.4 International commercial arbitration has expanded in recent years parallel to the 
increase in international trade, investment and disputes arising therefrom. In this perspective, 
international arbitration rules, mechanisms and institutions have been developed.5 
Arbitration process provides many advantages such as the humble cost of proceedings, saving from 
time, the less formal character of procedure, the subsequent relaxation of rules or evidence and provide 
parties more practical, efficient and neutral dispute resolution when compared to state court litigation.6 
The fact that arbitration proceedings are not conducted in public is one of the essential reason for which 
parties choose arbitration, namely, international arbitration is considerably more private and often more 
confidential.7 Arbitral hearings and the parties submissions or tribunals awards are virtually closed to 
the public and confidential. 
Moreover, international arbitration, which gives parties wide latitude regarding the type of arbitration to 
choose, may be either ‘’ institutional’’ or ‘’ ad hoc’’.8 By virtue of the party autonomy, parties have to 
make an early decision regarding whether their international arbitration should be "institutional" or "ad 
hoc".9 There are significant differences between these two forms of arbitration, theoretical and 
practical.10  
Institutional arbitration is conducted in accordance with institutional rules.11 An administrative body 
overseen such arbitration which is responsible for several important aspects of the arbitration including, 
e.g., constitution of the arbitral tribunal, fixing of the arbitrators' compensation, scrutinizing the arbitral 
award and other matters.12 In contrast, ad hoc arbitration is not conducted under the auspices or such 
supervision, the parties establish their own rules of procedure and subject only to the parties' arbitration 
agreement and applicable national arbitration laws.13 Institutional and ad hoc arbitration have their 
particular advantages.14 Institutional arbitration is conducted under a standing set of procedure rules, 
                                                          
4 Jan Paulsson and Georgios Petrochilos, UNCITRAL Arbitration, (KLI 2018),55  
5 Arbitration law differs from country to country. Most of the developed countries have arbitration laws that permit and regulate 
both national and international commercial arbitration. Some countries enacted their own laws as the procedures of arbitration 
and some adpoted commonly accepted rules and procedures as a model law. Such as Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Russia and 
Turkey adopted UNCITRAL Model Law. 
6 Amy J. Schmitz,’ Untangling the privacy paradox in arbitration’ (2006) 54(5) UKLR 1211, 1211 
7 Kyriaki Noussia, Confidentiality in Commercial International Arbitration: A Comparative Analysıs of the Position Under English, 
US, German and French Law (1st edn. Springer 2010), 9 
8 W. Laurence Craig, ‘Some Trends and Development in the Laws and Practice of International Arbitration’ (2016) 50 (special 
issue 2016) TILJ 699, 700  
9 Feebily(n 3), 88 
10 Kinga Timar, ‘The Legal Relationship between the Parties and the Arbitral Institution’ (2013) 2013 ELTE L.J. 103, 107 
11  Jeffrey Waincymer, Procedure and Evidence in International Arbitration, (1st edn. WK 2012) ,211 
12 Timar(n 10) , 108 
13 Christian Bühring-Uhle, Lars Kirchhoff& Gabriele Scherer, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business(1 st edn. KLI 
2006), 38 
14 Feebily (n 3), 89 
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supervised by professional staff and services, wherein parties can avail a well-tried and tested set of 
arbitration rules coupled with assistance from professional expertise who are familiar with these rules.15 
On the other hand, ad hoc arbitration is more flexible (may be shaped to meet the wishes of parties and 
the facts of the particular dispute) and more confidential.16 Moreover, ad hoc arbitration is to be said 
less expensive (since it avoids institutional fees-in exchange for being forced to bargain with arbitrators 
for their fees).17 If parties are cooperative in ad hoc arbitration valuable time is not taken to go through 
the administrative (and often bureaucratic) procedures of an arbitral institution and avoid the 
inconvenience of time limits that may be imposed by the institution.18   
In Turkey and in many other countries, local chambers of commerce and specific centres formed arbitral 
bodies and rules, and offered their supervisory service to local and international parties alike. There are 
three prominent commercial arbitration institutions established in Turkey: The Istanbul Chamber of 
Commerce Arbitration Centre19, the Istanbul Arbitration Centre20 and the Union of Chambers and 
Commodity Exchanges of Turkey21. TOBB Rules is the only one which follows the general structure and 
context that the major international arbitration institutions have between arbitration rules of the three 
institutions of Turkey. The wording and structure of the TOBB Rules is mostly similar to the ICC Rules 
of arbitration. Moreover, even the concepts of scrutiny of the award by the institution or the terms of 
reference which are thought to be exclusive to the ICC Rules, have been adopted by the TOBB Rules. 
This influence of the ICC Rules could be seen as a result of TOBB's title as the representative of ICC in 
Turkey.  In addition, the articles under the TOBB Rules which appears to be adopted from the ICC Rules, 
create a significant and even unlikely change in interpretation by using the words “procedural omissions” 
instead. ITO Arbitration Rules, on the other hand, can be easily distinguished on a prima facie 
examination from the other rules of arbitration. This is mostly due to the way the rule is structured.  Also 
ITO incorporates its rule about other alternative dispute resolution procedures under the same regulation 
and document with the arbitration rules. The ITO rules are lack a number of provisions concerning some 
important aspects of the arbitration that most other institutional rules incorporate; such as arbitrations 
                                                          
15 Tibor Varady, John J.Barcelo III, Stefan Kröll &Arthur T. Von Mehren (eds), International Commercial Arbitration a Transnational 
Perspective ( 6th edn. WAP 2015), 48 
16 Bühring-Uhle, Kirchhoff& Scherer( 13), 39 
17 Varady, Barcelo III, Kröll & Mehren (n 15), 49  
18 Unless a dispute arises, the content of an agreement to arbitrate will most of the time stay confidential between the parties. 
Therefore, it is not possible to obtain a certain statistic for a comparison between the number of agreements that provide for an 
institutional arbitration and ad hoc arbitration agreements. 
19 Hereinafter ‘’ ITOTAM’’ 
20 Hereinafter ‘’ ISTAC’’ 
21 Hereinafter ‘’ TOBB’’ 
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with more than two parties and the independence and/or impartiality of the arbitrators. This may be the 
result of a presumption that the rules of ITO are more likely to be applied to national arbitrations. This 
presumption is even more evident in many different provisions of the rules, such as the selection 
procedure of the arbitrators, and the way the arbitrator lists are created. 
Arbitral institutions could potentially have a prominent role in preserving the integrity of arbitral 
proceedings. This can be done with the help of an update of institutions' rules, which is also one of the 
important responsibilities of these institutions.22  Furthermore, arbitral institutions could use their 
knowledge of the pool of available, independent and impartial arbitrators so as to provide that no 
arbitrator is appointed who might jeopardize the aim of pursuing time and cost-efficient arbitral 
proceedings by impartial and independent arbitrators.23 Arbitral institutions may well sanction parties 
that misbehave in arbitrations under their rules.24 Particularly, it is acknowledged that the "allocation of 
costs can be a useful tool to encourage efficient behaviour and discourage unreasonable behaviour" in 
international arbitration and encouraged by leading arbitral institutions.25 Arbitral institutions could 
assume more delicate role by monitoring, supervising and sanctioning an arbitrator who misbehaves in 
arbitrations under the rules of the institutions. 26 
This thesis deals with the power and the duty of arbitral institutions to preserve the integrity of arbitral 
proceedings by upholding and enforcing ethical minimum standards in international arbitration and also 
highlights the significant role of arbitral institutions in holding the participants of an arbitration 
accountable. This objective can be achieved by arbitral institutions’ role making function and by 
exercising their multifarious power at the time of appointment and during the conduct of arbitral 
proceedings. The qualities and ethical duties that is required in an international arbitrator will be 
discussed in the first section. In the second section, arbitral institutions rule enforcing role will be 
discussed by not appointing the arbitrator who may jeopardize arbitral proceeding and by sanctioning. 
In addition, thesis will give specific references to three Turkish Arbitral Institutions rules and to compare 
them with some of the major international arbitration institutions worldwide. Finally, thesis will explain 
                                                          
22 Cristina Florescu, ‘ Arbitral Tribunal Power to Disqualify Unethical Counsel’ (2015) 4(4) JEDEP 15,23  
23 Günther J.Hovath & Stephan Wilske (edn.), Guerrilla Tactics in International Arbitration ( 1st edn KLI 2013) , 186 
24 Stephan Wilske, ‘Sanctions againts Counsel In International Arbitration - Possible, Desirable or Conceptual Confusion’ (1995) 
8(2) CAAJ 141, 143 
25 Timar (n 10), 108 
26 Hovarth & Wilske( n 23), 190 
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the ways and means at the disposal of arbitral institutions to preserve the integrity of arbitral proceedings 
and present a humble conclusion. 
II- THE RULE MAKING ROLE OF ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS  
"Private dispute resolution among commercial men is as old as commerce itself."27 In spite of its ancient 
history,28arbitration was regarded as a "bastard remedy" and arbitrators as "caricatures of their judicial 
siblings through the mid-nineteenth century in Europe and the United States.29   
Arbitration agreement was routinely voided30 and arbitral award was subject to intense judicial scrutiny, 
sometimes even rewriting prior to the twentieth century.31 Today, the scene has changed. International 
arbitration holds an lofty status and is generally revered as vital to world trade.32Arbitration is believed 
the normal way so as to resolve international business disputes, and almost all international agreements 
contain arbitration clauses.33Any nation must adjust its laws to accommodate the demands of 
international arbitration if they are interested in participating in the global economy.34 It is said that; 
‘’International arbitration has transformed itself from a "bastard remedy" into the crown prince of 
international dispute resolution’’35In its new status, international arbitration needs articulated ethical 
norms to guide and regulate participating attorneys, parties, arbitrators.36 In addition, international 
arbitration dwells in an ethical no-man's land.37Arbitration sets in a jurisdiction where neither party's 
counsel is licensed.38 The effect of national ethical codes39 is generally vague in extraterritorial area, as 
is the application of national ethical rules in a non-judicial forum such as arbitration.40 
                                                          
27 Craig, ‘’Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration’’, 705 
28 The ancient Sumerians, Persians, Egyptians, Greeks and Romans all had a tradition of arbitration. The development of a formal 
system of private dispute resolution is attributable to the medieval English courts of fairs and boroughs, which could adjudicate 
disputes between merchans and trades at markets and fairs. 
29 Thomas E. Carbonneau, ‘’Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law’’ (1996) 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1947 
30 Throughout the nineteent century, courts in the United States and England frequently invoked the doctrine of ‘ouster’ to void 
contractual arbitration clauses which they viewed ‘’ as unlawful circumventions of judicial jurisdiction and as denials of judicial 
justice.‘’ 
31 For instance, court was permitted  and routinely did revise legal determinations made by arbitrators in England. 
32 Stephen T. Ostrowski & Yuval Shany, ‘’Chromalloy: United States Law and International Arbitration at the Crossroads’’ (1998) 
73(5) N.Y.U. L. REV. 1650, 1650  
33 Klaus Peter Berger, International Economic Arbitration, ( 1st edn. K.1993) 62 
34 William W. Park, ‘’National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International Arbitration’’ (1989) 
63(3) TUL.L.Rev. 647,680 
35 Catherine A. Rogers, ‘’ Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration’’, (2002) 
23(2) MICH. J.INT’L L. 341, 350 
36 Ibid, 350 
37 Catherina Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration (1st edn.  OUP 2014), 96. 
38 William W.Park,  ‘’National Legal Systems and Private Dispute Resolution’’ (1988) 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 616,628 
39 At this crucial point, it is worth pointing out that Turkey is one of those countries who are concerned about developments in this 
global area and has created its own international arbitration code in accordance with international arbitration principles, 
international conventions and international arbitration institutions’ rules and usages. 
40 Catherina Rogers, ‘’ Contex and Institutional Structure in Attorney Regulation: Constructing an Enforcement Regime for 
International Arbitration’’  (2002) 39(1)  Stan.J.Int’L L. 1, 75 
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Institutions have a potentially prominent position when it comes to incorporating ethical standards within 
the rules of arbitration.41 Needless to say, their  role of managing the process is very critical in ensuring 
that unethical behaviour is stamped out in arbitration.42 To come up with a code of certain minimum 
ethical rules and obligations that bind all participants in arbitration under particular institutional rules is 
within the arbitral institutions' prerogative.43 Actually, contemporary ethical rules should oblige 
arbitrators, parties, their counsel, experts and witnesses to comply with this code. Particularly, arbitral 
institutions may well support regulation of counsel conduct by formulating rules interested in their 
behaviour.44 These rules should empower arbitral tribunals to discipline counsel with sanctions when 
counsel engages in unethical behaviour. Moreover, an arbitral institution could easily provide in its rules 
that Parties in arbitrations may only be represented by counsel who has assured the institution that he 
or she intends to abide by these rules. 
A- Basic principles of ethics for commercial arbitrators:  
Although the primary source for the obligations of an arbitrator is in the parties' agreement, in general, 
parties do not specify the particulars of the arbitrator's obligations but instead select a seat of arbitration 
and then incorporate one of the standard sets of institutional rules.45 Thus, it is possible to examine the 
major arbitral institution rules, the specific ethical rules from the arbitral institutions as well as the laws 
that govern arbitration46 and from this to synthesize the generally accepted ethical obligations of 
arbitrators. 
a. Duty of Independence and Impartiality 
The principle of that an arbitrator has a duty of independence and impartiality in international arbitration 
is a fundamental and universally accepted.47 At first sight, ‘independent’ and ‘impartial’ seem virtually 
                                                          
41 Hovarth & Wilske (n 23), 25 
42  Rogers, ‘’Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration’’ 80 
43 Wiiliam W.Park, ‘’National Legal Systems and Private Dispute Resolution’’,628 
 
44 Hovarth & Wilske (n 23), 25 
45 For example, the American Arbitration Association and the American Bar Association have collaborated to form The Code of 
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes. The International Bar Association has also created a code of Ethics for International 
Arbitrators. These two codes generally cover the same concerns. However, they differ in a few respects. The American Arbitration 
Association/American Bar Association code consists of black-letter canons with commentary that is similar to the American 
attorney code of ethics, and it is written in a "friendly" tone, while the International Bar Association code has a more statutory 
format written in a somewhat prohibitory tone.  
46 Following the lead of the UNCITRAL Model Law, several nations have enacted arbitration legislation which sets out the role of 
arbitrators. 
47 James Ng, ‘When the Arbitrator Creates the Conflict: Understanding Arbitrator Ethics through the IBA Guidelines on Conflict of 
Interest and Published Challenges’ (2015) 2(23) MCGILL J.D.R., 23   
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similar concept.48 However, there is a distinction between the concepts of impartiality and independence. 
Impartiality is the absence of any bias in the mind of the arbitrator in favour of, or prejudiced against, a 
particular party or the matter in dispute.49 On the other hand, the concept of independence is related to 
personal, financial, professional actual or past dependant connection or relationship with a party or the 
party's counsel.50 Impartiality is needed to ensure that justice is done while independence is needed to 
ensure that justice is seen to be done.51 Therefore, impartiality and independence are different concepts, 
as Bishop and Reed note; ‘’ An arbitrator who is impartial but not wholly independent may be qualified. 
In selecting party-appointed arbitrators in international arbitration, the absolutely inalienable and 
predominant standard should be impartiality’’.52 A clearer example of the concept of independence can 
be found in the International Chamber of Commerce rules that require each arbitrator to disclose 
whether there pre-exist any kind of relationship, past or present, direct or indirect, with any of the parties 
or counsellors assisting them to the Secretary General that may affect their independence, including " 
any facts or circumstances of a similar nature to those referred to in Article 11(2) concerning the 
arbitrator's impartiality or independence which may arise during the arbitration."53  
While independence is determined by an objective standard, impartiality is quite subjective that it goes 
to the actual state of mind and where applicable, ensuing conduct of the arbitrator.54Therefore, a lack of 
impartiality can be difficult to prove.55Partiality is sometimes associated with bias56; while the reasonable 
anticipation of partiality by an arbitrator is identified with the reasonable apprehension of bias, 
consequently courts review the facts and circumstances in which the arbitrator exercised his or her 
functions before inferring whether there was bias, and the courts have consequently relied upon a finding 
of apparent bias rather than actual bias in determining arbitrator impartiality.57 In addition, impartiality 
                                                          
48 Bruno Manzanares Bastida, ‘ The Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2007) 
6 Rev.E-Marcatoria 1,3 
49 Chiara Giovannucci Orlandi,’ Ethics for International Arbitrators’ (1998) 67 UMKC L. Rev. 93,108 
50 Laurence Shore, ‘’Disclosure and Impartiality: An Arbitrator's Responsibility Vis-6-vis Legal Standards’’ (2002) 57 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 34, 35 
51  Ng (n 47), 26 
52 Bishop D. Reed L., ‘Practical Guidelines for Interviewing, Selecting and Challenging Party Appointed Arbitrators in International 
Commercial Arbitration’ (1998) 14(4) AI 345, 350. 
53INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE RULES OF ARBITRATION art.11.3 (2017) [hereinafter "ICC ARBITRATION 
RULES']. 
54 Leon Trakman, ‘’The Impartiality and Independence of Arbitrators Reconsidered’ (2007) 10 INT.ARB. 999,1007 
 
55  Orlandi (n 49),94.   
56 Some arguments used to challenge an arbitrator;  ‘Arbitrator’s comment that Portuguese people were liars’ The Owners of the 
Steamship ‘Catalina’ and Others and The Owners of the Motor Vessel ‘ Norma’(1938) 61 LIL.Rep.360 , ‘Arbitrator being a former 
official adviser of the government’ Buraimi Oasis arbitration, ‘ Allegation of past partial behaviour of the arbitrator’ Tracomin S A 
v. Gibbs Nathaniel (Canada) LTD and another [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 586 , ‘Conferring with a party by the party-appointed arbitrator’ 
Sunkist Soft Drinks Inc. v. Sunkids Growers Inc. (1993) 10 F.3d 753 (11th Cir.), ‘ The arbitrator and another arbitrator are members 
of the same baristers, professional association or social organization’ LCIA Reference no. UN97/X11( June 5, 1997), LCIA 
Reference no.81132( November 15,2008) and LCIA Reference no.1303 ( November 22,2001).  
57 Trakman (n 54), 1007 
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must be demonstrated via some external behaviours which establish the arbitrator's state or frame of 
mind, like a professional or personal relationship with one of the parties that may reasonably give rise 
to a conclusion that an arbitrator was partial, if  there is no such relationship, partiality may be 
demonstrated through the arbitrator's conduct.58 Whether there are justifiable grounds for suspecting a 
lack of impartiality or independence is ultimately, as the English High Court reiterated recently, a matter 
that is ‘classically appropriate for a case-specific judgment’59. 
In practice, "national courts and arbitral institutions generally  base their decisions about impartiality 
entirely on 'appearances' and, in at least some significant number of cases, will disqualify presumptively 
unbiased arbitrators merely because the apparent risk (that is, the appearance) of actual bias is 
unacceptably great.’’60 In ‘’Locabail (UK) Ltd v. Bayfield Properties Ltd’’61, the case concerned a solicitor 
sitting as a deputy judge who discovered during the proceedings that his firm had acted in litigation 
against the ex-husband of one of the parties. The court held that the pecuniary interest involved in the 
case were not such nature to automatically disqualify the judge but that it had to be determined on the 
basis of the particular facts of the case whether there was a ‘real danger of bias’. In the case, the court 
denied such a danger since the judge’s knowledge of the case involving the ex-husband was limited 
and the judge’s interest in the fees earned by his law firm from that case tenuous and insubstantial.62 
The English Court of Appeal stated explicit guidance on possible circumstances where a lack of 
independence by an arbitrator vis a vis one of the parties cannot be raised, including "previous political 
associations," previous memberships of "social or sporting or charitable bodies, "to act for or against 
any party, solicitor or advocate" involved in an arbitration and it is well accepted legal principle governing 
independence adjudication that no one should be a judge in his own cause.63 Thus major shareholders 
                                                          
58 Murray L. Smith, ‘Impartiality of Party-Appointed Arbitrator’ (1990) 6(4) Arb.Int’l 320,330 
59  In the ‘’W. Ltd. v. M. Sdn Bhd, [2016] EWHC (Comm)’’ case; the sole arbitrator in that case was a partner of a law firm which 
regularly advised an affiliate of the defendant, which in turn earned significant remuneration for that work. On this basis, the 
claimant sought to challenge the award on the ground of apparent bias. It was common ground that the arbitrator himself had 
never done any work for the defendant and had, for the last ten years, operated effectively as a sole practitioner who did not 
concern himself with the affairs of the partnership. Ordinarily, that would be the end of the matter. However, IBA Guidelines, para. 
1.4 includes as a condition to be disclosed circumstances in which ‘[t]he arbitrator or his or her firm regularly advises the party, or 
an affiliate of the party, and the arbitrator or his or her firm derives significant income therefrom’. What was worse, para. 1.4 fell 
within the ‘Non-Waivable Red List’, which pertains to matters which trigger automatic recusal. Counsel for the defendants 
submitted that the IBA Guidelines were ‘pretty emphatic’, a very powerful factor’, and even that a real possibility of bias had arisen 
‘because that is what we are told through Paragraph 1.4’. J. Knowles unhesitatingly gave short shrift to this argument. 
60 Silvano Domenica Orsi, ‘’Ethics in International Arbitration: New Considerations for Arbitrators and Counsel’ (2013) 3 Arb.Brief 
92,95. Historically, a lack of neutrality or indeed the appearance of impartiality were not requirements in some countries. In 
medieval Iceland, for example, arbitrators were neither required nor expected "to be neutral or impartial so long as they acted in 
moderation and remained effective." Moreover, eleventh century France saw parties selecting "relatives, friends or business 
associates" to arbitrate disputes involving property.  
61 Locabail (UK) Ltd. v Bayfields Properties[2000] 1 All ER 83 
 
62 Locabail (UK) Ltd. v Bayfields Properties[2000] 1 All ER 83 
63 Locabail (UK) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd. [2000] QB 451 at [480] para. 25 (Eng.). 
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or directors of the parties are not suitable arbitrators.64 On the contrary, minor shareholders may not 
give rise to lack of independence, since the value of which will not be significantly affected by the 
outcome of an arbitration.65 In ‘’ Laker Airways v FLS Aerospace’’66, it is discussed that whether a 
barristers who are appointed as arbitrators being in the same chamber as one of the parties counsel 
may be allowed or not and the English Court held that the fact that an arbitrator was from same 
chambers as counsel for one of the parties did not lead to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or 
independence.  
In general, though, independence and impartiality of the arbitrator are required in the institutional arbitral 
rules.67 This is the case in the World Intellectual Property Organization,68 London Court of International 
Arbitration69, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules70, American 
Arbitration Association.71The majority of arbitral institutions and judicial decisions have adopted a 
standard of "justifiable doubts" for the arbitrator's independence or impartiality.72 At the IBA Rules of 
Ethics for International Arbitrators,73 which provides us with an explicit definition of these terms. 
According to Article 3 of these rules, "partiality arises where an arbitrator favours one of the parties, or 
where he is prejudiced in relation to the subject matter of the dispute. Dependence arises from 
relationships between an arbitrator and one of the parties." 
Amongst the Turkish institutions, TOBB Arbitration Rules article 19(1) solely mention the impartiality of 
the arbitrators and avoid the use of the word “independence”. The TOBB Rules may be seen as an 
intended disregard of the test of independence and choice in favour of a more subjective criteria 
consciously. Nonetheless, this interpretation in favour of a more subjective test may give rise to an 
                                                          
64 Orsi (n 60), 96 
65 AT & T Corporation and another Saudi Cable [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127 
66 Laker Airways v FLS Aerospace[1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 45. 
67 The ICC is the noted exception. The ICC Article 11(1) 2017 provides that: "Every arbitrator must be and remain independent of 
the parties involved in the arbitration." 
68 World Intellectual Property Organization (hereinafter ‘’WIPO ARBITRATION RULES’’) art. 22 (2014). 
69  The London Court of International Arbitration (hereinafter ‘’LCIA’’). THE LCIA RULES arts. 5.3 (2014). Some decisions of LCIA 
regarding impartiality and independence; (Parties Not Indicated) LCIA Court Decision on Challenge to Arbitrator, LCIA Reference 
No. UN96/X15, 29 May 1996; (Parties Not Indicated), LCIA Court Decision on Challenge to Arbitrator, LCIA Reference No. 9147, 
27 January 2000; (Parties Not Indicated), LCIA Court Decision on Challenge to Arbitrator, LCIA Reference No. 1303, 22 November 
2001; (Parties Not Indicated), LCIA Court Decision on Challenge to Arbitrator, LCIA Reference No. 0252, 1 July 2002; (Parties 
Not Indicated), LCIA Court Decision on Challenge to Arbitrator, LCIA Reference No.UN3490, 21 October 2005; (Parties Not 
Indicated), LCIA Court Decision on Challenge to Arbitrator, LCIA Reference No. 81160, 28 August 2009.   
70 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013) art. 6(7), 12(1) [hereinafter 'UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules'].   
71 American Arbitration Association Rules art. 18 (2013) [hereinafter "AAA ARBITRATION RULES']. 
72 Most arbitration institutions adopt this standard. THE LCIA RULES art. 10 (2014), AAA Arbitration Rules art.17 (2013). In 
addition, England uses a stricter standard and requires a "real danger of bias" to be present. ‘AT&T Corp. v. Saudi Cable Co., 2 
LLOYD'S REP. 127 (2000)’ (discussing and establishing the standard that arbitrators-and subsequently the award-may be 
challenged only if a "real danger of bias" exists). 
73 International Bar Association Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators art.3 (1987) [hereinafter IBA Rules]. The International 
Bar Association (IBA) has published practice rules and guidelines for use in international commercial arbitration. IBA rules and 
guidelines are not binding but may serve as an important resource for practitioners and arbitrators. 
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unintended ambiguity. In the context of TOBB Rules, the independence of an arbitrator would be more 
likely to be interpreted as incorporating both the tests of independence and impartiality together. 
According to the Istanbul Arbitration Association’s Code of Ethics74 Rules articles 1(1), 2(1) and 3 as 
well as article 12 of the ISTAC Rules also contains detailed provisions regarding the independence and 
impartiality of arbitrators. ITOTAM Arbitration Rules art. 14 using either of the terms. 
At first sight it may be thought that no valid distinction can be drawn between the concept of 
independence, impartiality and neutrality, but the neutrality of an arbitrator goes much further than the 
other two concepts.75 The concept of neutrality reflects an objective status and is linked to the nationality 
of the arbitrator, also requires that the arbitrator is intermediate and equidistant in thought and action 
throughout the arbitral process.76  
In addition, this is predicated on the assumption that an arbitrator who shares the same nationality, 
culture and language as one of the parties will be susceptible or sympathetic to that party and to their 
position in the arbitration, with obvious concerns for both the fairness of the process and ultimate award, 
as the acceptability of the award will be dependent on the quality, skills and credibility of the arbitrators 
who deliver it.77 Nonetheless, it is common practice and foreseen in most arbitration rules that a sole 
arbitrator or a chairman should be a different nationality than either party, and it is submitted in such 
cases the exclusion of an arbitrator with the same nationality as either party is based more on the implied 
agreed qualifications of the arbitrator than on the basis of his perceived lack of impartiality.78  On the 
contrary, impartiality requires an investigation to determine evidence of bias.79 By virtue of the difficulties 
                                                          
74 This Code has been prepared by the Istanbul Arbitration Association and sets forth the ethical rules the arbitrators must comply 
with. The decision-making process carried out by arbitrators will only be perceived as fair and just by all the persons and institutions 
involved provided that the arbitrators possess the qualities specified in the Code of Ethics and act in accordance with such Code 
through the arbitration proceedings. The main aim of this Code is to ensure the fair and proper conduct of the arbitration 
proceedings and establish a means to serve as a guide on how embody the intangible attributes required of arbitrators such as 
impartiality, independence, fairness, honesty, competence, conscientiousness, discreetness and prudence in practice. A 
cooperation protocol is signed between Istanbul Arbitration Centre (hereinafter ISTAC) and Istanbul Arbitration Association 
(hereinafter ISTA) so as to provide a multifaceted support to help build up a sectoral structure in arbitration area and to develop 
the arbitration culture in Turkey on 18 July 2018.  
 
 
75 Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practices of International Commercial Arbitration, (2rd ed. CUP 2016), 140 
76 Bastida (n 48), 5 
77 M. Scott Donahey, ‘‘The Independence and Nationality of Arbitrators’’ (1992) 9(4) J. Int'l Arb. 31, 32 
78 Re The Owners of the Steamship ‘’ Catalina’’ and The Owners of the Motor Vessel ‘’ Norma’’ [1938] 61 L1 L Rep.360. 
79 Rom K.L. Chung, ‘’Conceptual Framework of Arbitrators' Impartiality and Independence’’ (2014) 80 ARB INT. 2, 3 
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in establishing in practice, the need to look for external behaviour that establishes the arbitrator's state 
of mind is necessary.80  
A lack of neutrality does not automatically result in partiality, yet an arbitrator may not be deemed neutral 
if he or she is behaving partially81 and the presiding arbitrator must be, and be seen to be, entirely neutral 
as well as impartial so parties from different nationalities will require the presiding arbitrator to have a 
different nationality.82 The requirement that an arbitrator's nationality be different from that of the parties 
is reflected83 in various international arbitration rules including UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,84 the AAA 
Rules,85 LCIA Rules86, the ICC Arbitration Rules87 and the WIPO.88 
Among the rules of the Turkish institutions, TOBB Arbitration Rules is the only set of rules that 
incorporate a limitation regarding nationality of arbitrator. TOBB Rules in article 17(2) follow the general 
approach by putting a default limitation on the nationality of the arbitrator and allowing an exception for 
an agreement of the parties. Under TOBB Rules, in cases where the parties are foreign nationals, the 
Council appoints the sole arbitrator or the chairman of the tribunal from a different country; unless the 
parties agree otherwise.  
b) Duty of Competency 
Arbitrators have a general obligations to resolve the parties’ dispute includes an obligation to conduct 
the arbitral proceeding and the case with appropriate care so arbitrator has a duty of not to accept an 
appointment beyond her competency89 which are specified some ethical rules.90 Therefore, this can be 
said that there is a duty of due care.91  In addition, there is a duty not to accept an appointment unless 
                                                          
80 Hong-Lin Yu & Laurence Shore, Independence, ‘’Impartiality and Immunity of Arbitrators - US and English Perspectives’’ (2003) 
52 INT'L & COMP. L.Q 935, 936  
81 Feebily (n 3), 91 
82 Chung (n 78), 6 
83 Donahey (n 76),32 
84UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Dec. 16, 2013) at 6.7 
85 AAA ARBITRATION RULES art. 12.4 (2014) 
86 LCIA Arbitration Rules art. 6 (2014)  
87 ICC Arbitration Rules art. 13.5 (2017). 
88 WIPO Arbitration Rules art. 20 (2014)  
89 Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration, 96. 
90 IBA Rules of Ethics, Introductory Note and AAA/ABA Code of Ethics, Canon 1(B) (3) 
91 Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration ,457. IBA Rules of Ethics R.2.3. (1987) 
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actually possessing the requisite skills, such as language,92 experience93, education94 and unless the 
appointee is assured of being able to commit requisite time and resources to the arbitration, namely, 
unless able to accommodate the arbitration in his or her schedule.95 These obligations also extend to a 
duty to decline appointment in arbitration for which a potential arbitrator is ill-prepared or ill-suited, 
whether by virtue of a lack of expertise or otherwise.96  The arbitrator’s duties of care and competency 
are in some respects similar to those imposed on other professionals, such as lawyers, architect or 
engineer.97 In arbitration, the parties entrust an arbitrator with prominent task and they expect him to 
perform with due care.98 This obligations include devoting the necessary time and attention to the case 
as well as addressing the evidence and submission with the skill and ability necessary to understand 
them.99  
Among the Turkish institutions, Istanbul Arbitration Association’s Code of Ethics is the only set of rules 
that includes duty of competency via Art. 2(2) and article 5.1(a).100 Under rule 2(2), the prospective 
arbitrator should only accept appointment if he or she has sufficient knowledge of the language of the 
arbitration and is competent to resolve the dispute, otherwise the prospective arbitrator should decline 
the appointment.  
c. Duty to Uphold the Integrity and Fairness of the Proceeding 
                                                          
92 It is highly desirable that an arbitrator has an adequate working knowledge of the language in which the arbitration is to take 
place. If an arbitrator does not have a good knowledge of the language, ıt becomes necessary to engage an interpreter. Translating 
oral evidence accurately into another language is a very difficult task and it also adds considerably to the expense of the arbitral 
proceeding.  
93 It is becoming increasingly important for international arbitrators to show their awareness of the World of international trade 
relations and of the different traditions, aims and expectations of the people of that World. 
94 The most important qualification for an international arbitrator is that he/she should be experienced in the law and practice of 
arbitration. The AAA maintains a list of people experinced in arbitration from which arbitrators may be selected. The ICC does not 
maintain its own list of possible arbitrators, but relies upon its National Committees to put forward names. 
95 Henry Gabriel, Anjanette H. Raymond, ‘’Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators: Basic Principles and Emerging Standards’’ (2005) 
5(2) WYO. L. Rev. 453, 457 
96 IBA ethics rules art. 2(2)( A prospective arbitrator shall accept an appointment only if heis fully satisfied that he is competent to 
determine the issues in dispute,and has adequate knowledge of the language of arbitration.) 
97 Datuk Sundra Rajoo, ‘‘Importance of Arbitrators’ Ethics and Integrity in Ensuring Quality Arbitrators’’ (2013) 6(2) 
CONTEMP.ASIA ARB.J. 329, 332 
98 Alan Redfern, Martin Hunter, Costantine Pastarsides, Nigel Blackaby, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (6th edn., 
OUP 2015), 268 
99 Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration Volume II (2th edn., WK 2014), 1992 
100  According to provision; ‘’ While the appointment of a prospective arbitrator is being considered, the prospective arbitrator may 
answer questions directed to him other by one of the parties or their representatives with the purpose of ascertaining whether he 
or she is suitable and qualified for the appointment. During such dialogue the prospective arbitrator may obtain information from 
one of the parties or their representatives regarding the general nature of the dispute but the most permit any discussion on the 
merits thereof. Any such communication must remain limited to the purpose of assessing whether any circumstances exist that 
could affect the arbitrator’s competence with respect to the dispute in question as well we how much time the arbitrator should 
devote to the arbitration proceedings. An arbitrator should ensure that any party requesting contract with him or her limits the 
dialogue to this scope as well’’. 
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The arbitrator is bound to conduct the procedure in a fair manner, uphold the integrity and treat both 
parties equally and respect their right to be heard.101 It is important that an arbitrator not only uphold the 
integrity and fairness of the arbitration process, but also that the arbitrator give the appearance of doing 
so and these duties extend to all aspects of the proceedings.102Thus, an arbitrator should neither solicit 
appointment103 nor accept an appointment if the arbitrator cannot conduct the arbitration promptly.104 
Arbitrator must take all reasonable efforts to prevent delaying tactics, harassment of the parties or other 
participants, or any other disruption of the arbitration process.105  
If the parties set forth the arbitrator's authority in their agreement, the arbitrator ’s obligation include the 
duty generally to conduct the arbitration in accordance with this agreement that includes giving effect to 
provisions of the agreement regarding procedure( e.g., disclosure, hearings, evidentiary rules), 
timetables( e.g., time to render award).106 In such a case, arbitrators should neither exceed nor fall short 
of the mandated authority.107 The arbitrator is required to exercise authority completely and to abide by 
all provisions of the agreement.108 This obligation is made express in some ethical rules and national 
laws.109 
In addition, an arbitrator should not enter into any financial, business, professional, family or social 
relationship when serving as an arbitrator that would create a lack of impartiality or the appearance of a 
lack of impartiality.110 This obligation may be extended for a reasonable time after the resolution of the 
case in circumstances in which there may be an appearance that the arbitrator was influenced by the 
anticipation or expectation of the relationship or interest.111 
                                                          
101 Julian D.M.Lew , Julian A Mistelis, Stefan M Kröll, Comperative International Commercial Arbitration (1st edn., KLI, 2003), 282. 
UNCITRAL, art.18 
102 Gabriel, Raymond, 458. 
103 IBA Ethics Rules art. 2.4 (1987) 
104  Lew, Mistelis, Kröll, 280 
105 Born, International Commercial Arbitration Volume II, 1993 
106 Gabriel and Raymond(n 94), 458. ICC art.19, ICSID Rules, Art. 20(2), UNCITRAL art.19 
107 AAA/ABA Code of Ethics, Canon I(E).  
108 Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration, 96 
109 ICC art.19, ICSID Rules, art. 20(2), UNCITRAL art.19 
110 IBA R. 3.2, 3.3 (1987). 
111 Gabriel and Raymond (n 94), 459 
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Among the Turkish Institutions, the most detailed provisions in ISTA Ethics Rules112which mentions not 
only fairness but also equality of arbitrations. The ISTAC Arbitrations Rules, Art. 19113entails such a duty 
only in terms of sole arbitrator. TOBB art. 26 and ITOTAM art. 21 also provide similar provisions.  
d. Duty of Disclosure 
To ensure compliance with the requirements of independence and impartiality, arbitrators are under a 
duty to fully disclose any personal interests or relationships with the parties or witnesses and update 
such disclosures, if circumstances change during the course of the arbitration.114 Duty of disclosure is 
explicitly foreseen in most arbitration rules and laws.115 In addition, the arbitrator’s disclosure duty have 
a contractual aspect that follows from the implied term of the agreement between the parties and the 
arbitrator.116 The rationale and character of the obligation explained in a U.S. state court decision as 
follows: ‘’ It is beyond and question that an arbitrator has a duty of disclosure. Such a duty is predicated 
upon the enormous power, responsibility and discretion vested in the arbitrator and the very limited 
judicial review of the arbitrator’s decisions. So often, significant sums of money at stake. And of course, 
an experienced arbitrator whose livelihood depends upon his reputation and skills, always recognizes 
there is a competitive market for such services. Thus, the duty of disclosure requires a certain degree 
of introspective reflection or what is commonly known as due diligence. While an arbitrator need not 
launch a full investigation into his past, an arbitrator must make a reasonable effort, consistent with the 
effort and care ordinarily exercised by a person who seeks to satisfy a legal obligation, to inform 
himself/herself of the interests, contracts, and/ or relationships that are required to be disclosed’’.117 
This duty encompasses to disclose all relevant facts118 which they become known, any interests or 
relationships in the past or that involve family members, employers, partners or business associates.119 
                                                          
112 According to Article 1;  ‘’ The arbitrator shall conduct every stage of the arbitration proceeding independently and in a fair and 
just manner ans shall recuse him or herself on his or her own initiative where such conduct is not possible. The arbitrator shall 
treat the parties equally, fairly and equaitably and shall not represent any of the parties. To this end,  the arbitrator shall  not, either 
on behalf of or againsts, any party engage in any behaviour that could constitute a violation of the right to a fair trial or infringement 
of the right of defense of any one of the parties and shall avoid any expressions or actions that could create such an impression. 
’’  
113 Article 19 requires; ‘’ The Sole Arbitrator or Arbitral Tribunal shall conduct the proceedings fairly and impartially, act in respect 
to the principle of the equality of the parties and ensure that each party has a full opportunity to present its case.’’  
114Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration, 240 
115 AAA/ABA Canon 11 (2004, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules art. 11(2013), ICC art. 11 (2017), IBA Rules of Ethics Art.3(2) and 
Art. 4.1 (1987), LCIA Art.5(3).  
116 Orlandi (n 49), 97  
117 Karlseng v. Cooke, 346 S.W.3d 85, 97 
118 The big question is what information is relevant and what is sufficient to justify an objection to the arbitrator. Due to different 
perceptions as to what facts may be relevant, some institutions prescribe in detail what types of information is required. Extensive 
guidelines can be found in Art. 4.2 of IBA rules of ethics. 
119  Ng (n 47), 26.  AAA/ABA Canon II(A)(2) (2004) 
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In Saba Fakes v. Turkey120 case, the arbitrator disclose that Turkey had appointed him to another ICSID 
Tribunal. The disclosing arbitrator was challenged and subsequently the challenge was dismissed.    
 Moreover, an arbitrator has an affirmative duty to inform herself of any possible conflicts of interest.121 
Arbitrators should use common sense to disclose those factors which objectively could be relevant, 
rather than remote or distant factors.122 To apply a uniform acceptable test to all cultural environments 
is difficult, by virtue of the approach to challenges also has an influence on the extent of the disclosure 
requirements.123 ( paraf. Yap.kaynakların kontrolünü yap). The arbitrator’s disclosure are intended 
primarily so as to enable the parties to ascertain whether prospective arbitrators satisfy applicable 
standards of independence and impartiality124 as well as to exercise their challenge rights if they believe 
that these standards are not satisfied125. Therefore, disclosure helps to select the right arbitrator and 
avoids selecting an arbitrator who could subsequently be challenged by the other side on account of a 
conflict of interest.126 In a LCIA case,127 a prospective arbitrator disclosed that he was a partner in a firm 
that had previously advised the respondent in relation to the contracts which were the subject of the 
arbitration, even though the arbitrator had not been a member of that firm at the time when the advice 
had been given. Based on this disclosure, an LCIA division decided not to appoint the arbitrator.  
The duty of disclosure is an ongoing duty for an arbitrator and arises whenever a prospective arbitrator 
is approached for appointment, continues throughout the proceedings until the arbitration 
terminated.128If new circumstances arise that may lead to any doubts as to an arbitrator’s impartiality or 
independence, arbitrator should disclose once he becomes aware of them to the parties and to his fellow 
arbitrators.129Nevertheless, this rule should be applied realistically so that the burden of disclosure does 
not become so onerous that business people  should not be discouraged who are best suited to decide 
disputes from becoming arbitrators.130The basis for disqualification due to a personal relationship with 
a party to the proceeding is different from disqualification for failure to disclose the relationship.131Even 
                                                          
120 ICSID Case, ARB/07/20, Mr.Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, Decision on the Claimant’s Proposal for Disqualification of a 
Member of the Arbitral Tribunal of 26 April 2008. 
121 AAA/ABA Canon II(2)(B). 
122 Eastwood, ‘ A Real Danger of Confusion? English Law Relating to Bias in Arbitrators’ (2001) 17 Arb Int 287, 298  
123 James H. Carter, ‘Rights and Obligations of the Arbitrator’ (1997) 52(1) DRJ 171, 172 
124 Orsi (n 60), 100 
125 Stephan Wilske, ‘The Ailing Arbitrator - Identification, Abuse and Prevention of a Potentially Dangerous Delaying and 
Obstruction Tool’ (2014) 7(2) CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J., 300 
126 Karel Daele, Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators in International Arbitration (1st edn. KLI 2012) 95 
127 LCIA Reference No. UN 96/X15, Decision of 29 May 1996. 
128 Orsi (n 60), 100 
129 Yu, Shore (n 79), 940  
130 Peter Halprin, Stephan Wah, ‘Ethics in International Arbitration’ (2018)2018(1) Disp.Resol.87, 89 
131 Daele (n 125), 97 
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though, an arbitrator's relationship with a party might not be decisive, the failure to disclose the 
relationship would be sufficient for disqualification.132 
Given the fact that all parties request, an arbitrator should withdraw after the disclosure.133If less than 
all the parties request the withdrawal, the arbitrator should do so unless specific procedures for 
challenging an arbitrator are set forth in the arbitration agreement.134Provided that the agreement sets 
forth procedures for removing an arbitrator, the procedures should be followed rigorously. Otherwise, 
withdrawal would not be mandatory, provided the arbitrator decides that the reason for the challenge is 
not significant,135that the arbitrator can act impartially,136 and that withdrawal would cause un fair delay 
or expense to another party or would be contrary to the ends of justice.137 
The leading American case on disclosure by arbitrators is ‘Commonwealth Coatings Corporation v. 
Continental Casualty Company’.138In the case at hand, one of the three arbitrator members of the 
tribunal had previously served as a consultant for one party.139 In fact, he had worked for that party as 
an engineer. Upon his appointment, the arbitrator did not disclose his pre-existing business connections 
with the appointing party.140As soon as the other (losing) party became aware of this relationship, 
claiming the arbitrator's partiality, he asked the court to vacate the award. The Court held that arbitrators 
are required to disclose any interests or relationships which might give rise to partiality or the appearance 
of partiality and set put aside an award based on the principle of ‘evident partiality’ as the presiding 
arbitrator failed to a four to five-year consulting relationship with a party to the arbitration.141 
Nevertheless, the Court failed to provide a clear standard of impartiality and independence. While 
Justice Black said, "We should be even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than 
judges, since the former have completely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are not 
subject to appellate review", Justice White, in a concurring opinion, suggested that an arbitrator should 
not be automatically disqualified for having had a business relationship with a party if both parties are 
informed, or, if the parties are unaware of the relationship, but the relationship is trivial.142The fractured 
                                                          
132 Knickerbocker Textile Corp. v. Sheila-Lynn, Inc., 16 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1939) 
133 Carter (n 122), 58 
134  Daele (n 125), 80  
135  Stephan Wilske, ‘The Ailing Arbitrator - Identification, Abuse and Prevention of a Potentially Dangerous Delaying and 
Obstruction Tool’ ,301 
136 Daele (n 125), 81 
137 Lew, Mistelis, Kröll (n 100), 282 
138 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968). 
139 Gabriel, Raymond (n 94), 461 
140 Gabriel, Raymond (n 94), 461 
141  Commonwealth Coatings v. Continental Casualty Company, 149 
142 Ibid at 151 
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Supreme Court decision has led to confusion in light of the diverging opinions of Justice Black and 
Justice White and it has gave rise to varied and inconsistent lower court decisions. In Commonwealth 
Coatings, the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that a duty of disclosure needs to be 
imposed upon the arbitrators.143  
Among the Turkish institutions ISTAC art. 12(3) and ITOTAM art.14(2) and (3) mention duty of 
disclosure. However, the most detailed provisions in ISTA Ethics Rules art. 4.  
e. Duty to Act in a Fiduciary Manner 
Confidentiality  which is the most prominent feature in the arbitral proceedings.144 Some parties value 
confidentiality more than speed or economy.145 Arbitration allows parties to resolve their disputes 
privately and with assurance that the substance of the proceedings will not be disclosed.146 
Confidentiality generally addresses with the obligations of parties not to reveal information pertaining to 
the content of the process, evidence adduced and document produced, transcripts of hearing or award 
rendered.147 In other words, conﬁdentiality should preclude disclosure of any information or materials 
provided during arbitration proceedings, or disclosure and use of arbitral award in other arbitrations or 
state court proceedings.148 The aim of the confidentiality is to prevent disclosure of information.149 There 
is no domestic150 and international consensus on the extent of confidentiality.151 
The duty of confidentiality in relation to the arbitrator has not been viewed uniformly by all domestic 
courts.152 Nonetheless, the predominant view is that arbitration a confidential process inherently and 
therefore arbitrators have a duty of confidentiality as a matter of course, whether express in the rules or 
                                                          
143 Gabriel, Raymond (n 94), 416 
144  Gary B. Born, International Arbitration: Law and Practice (1st edn. KLI 2012), 199  
145 Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration, 97 
146  Philip Rothman, ‘Pssst, Please Keep It Confidential’ (1994) 49(3) Disp. RESOL. J. 69,69  
147 Micheal Fesler, ‘The Extent of Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2012) 49 
148  Noussia (n 7), 26 
149 Brown A.C.,‘ Presumption Meets Reality : An Exploration of the Confidentiality Obligation in International Commercial 
Arbitration’ (2001) 16(4)  AUILA 969,970  
150 Even though, English case law copes with confidentiality of arbitral proceedings, the English Arbitration Act 1999 makes any 
express reference to confidentiality and does not contain a provision on confidentiality. Yet, this omission was not regarded as an 
indication that confidentiality was not taken into consideration. The drafters of the English Arbitration Act 1996 finally decided 
against statutory provision for confidentiality in arbitration because of difficulties in the light of many exceptions and qualiﬁcations 
that would have to follow. Departmental Advisory Committee to conclude that the courts should be left to continue to work out its 
implications on a pragmatic case by case basis and also commenting that to do so might hurt English arbitration and create further 
litigation. 
151 Avinash Poorey and Ronan Feehily,’ Confidentiality and Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration: Finding the 
Right Balance’ (2017) Harv.Negot.L.Rev.275, 282 
152 Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration,  96 
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not.153 In addition, most national laws contain provisions expressly requiring that deliberations among 
member of arbitral tribunal be treated as confidential. Similarly, it is generally accepted that deliberations 
of the arbitrators are confidential in most of institutional rules154 and by ethical or professional guidelines 
for conduct of international arbitrators. The arbitrator’s confidentiality is less controversial or uncertain 
than in relation to the parties, presumably since the latter are the beneficiaries of the duty and thus the 
ones who can waive its entitlements.155 An arbitrator has to preserve the confidential and private nature 
of the proceedings, namely, should keep all matters relating to the arbitration confidential and should 
never use confidential information for his own gain or personal advantage.156 In addition, unless the 
parties give consent, an arbitrator is not allowed to communicate any detail or names.157 Provided that 
an arbitrator has reached a decision, all parties should be informed of the decision before the decision 
is reported to anyone else.158 If there is more than one arbitrator that decide the case, the arbitrator 
deliberations are not to be shared with anyone, since the confidentiality of the arbitral deliberations is 
central to the adjudicative character and integrity of the arbitral process.159 Moreover, administrative 
rules govern confidentiality between the parties and the arbitrator and administrative body, yet not 
between the parties themselves.160 An arbitrator has the responsibility and the power to maintain the 
privacy of the hearings and most institutional rules provide for the presumptive privacy of  arbitral 
hearings.161The arbitrator may enforce this mandate by excluding from the hearing any non-parties or 
persons not essential to the proceeding, including witnesses not currently testifying.162 
In order to provide a confidential arbitration, there are many institutional rules. Nonetheless, all 
institutional rules do not contain a provision concerning the confidentiality of the arbitration.  The ICC 
Arbitration Rules is the first set of rules that comes to mind which does not explicitly provide for a 
                                                          
153 Waincymer (n 11), 103 
154 IBA Ethics Rules 9, LCIA 30(2), WIPO Rules Art.76, ICSID Rule 15, ICC Art.22(3) and APPENDIX I – STATUTES OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION art. 6, ITO Arbitration Rules article 24(1) and ISTA Ethic Rules Art. 6. 
155  Redfern, Hunter, Pastarsides, Blackaby (n 97), 269 
156  AAA Canon VI(A)-(B). 
157 Rew, Mistelis, Kröll (n 100), 283 
158 Redfern, Hunter, Pastarsides, Blackaby (n 97), 270 
159 Waincymer (n 11), 104 
 
161  IBA R. 9 (1987), UNCITRAL RULES (2013) art.28(3), ICC Art.26 (2017), AAA Art.25, ICSID Rules Rule 32(2). LCIA Rules 
article 19(4) takes a slightly different approach and grants the discretion to make the hearings public to the arbitral tribunal as well 
as the parties. Under TOBB Rules art. 141 the publicity of the hearings is in theory harder to achieve: a mutual approval of the 
arbitral tribunal and the parties is required. ITOTAM art.32(5) states confidentiality as; ‘’Unless the parties agree otherwise, the 
hearings shall be confidential’’. 
162 AAA R. 23 (2003) 
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confidential arbitration. This is a result of a conscious choice made by the ICC article 22(3) to leave the 
matter of confidentiality to the decision of the parties, arbitrators and local courts.163   
Among the rules of the Turkish Institutions, TOBB Arbitration Rules article 33(2)164 and ITOTAM art. 
44165 adopt a very similar wording to the ICC Rules and therefore bear the same consequences. The 
provisions that exists under both the ICC Rules, ITOTAM Rules and the TOBB Rules, do not entail a 
complete obligation of confidentiality by itself since they solely refer to trade secrets and “confidential 
information”. Thus, the question of what should be deemed confidential is a matter that seems to be left 
to the discretion of the arbitral tribunal. Moreover, a party who is concerned about the disclosure of a 
document that contains trade secrets but at the same time bears value as an evidence, may well ask 
for such a document to be submitted solely to the tribunal or its chairman, without disclosing it to the 
other party. Nonetheless, this is suggested that such a procedure could place the arbitration procedure 
under the risk of violating the principle of due process, even in the presence of parties' consent; because 
due process is considered as a matter of public policy.166  
E. Duty to Communicate 
The duty to communicate is a duty which extends to all aspects of the proceedings, for instance, discuss 
the case with one party in the absence of the other.167 It is important that an arbitrator communicates 
equally with the parties168, hence the arbitrator should not participate in ex parte communications with 
parties unless the agreement of the parties otherwise provides169 or except in unavoidable and justifiable 
circumstances; unless the communications concern purely procedural matters ( of which the other party 
is then promptly informed), or unless the absent party failed to attend a meeting or hearing, having been 
                                                          
163 Yves Derains, Eric A. Schwartz, Guide to the ICC Rules of Arbitration (2nd edn., KLI, 2005), 284 
164 Article provide that; “The Arbitral Tribunal shall take the necessary measures to maintain the commercial secrets and the 
confidential information belong to the parties that are evident in the file.” 
165 According to Article 44; ‘’ 1. The arbitral tribunal shall take appropriate measures to ensure the protection of trade secrets and 
confidential information disclosed during the arbitral proceedings. 2. The parties, arbitrators, members of the Arbitration Court, 
Secretariat personnel, witnesses, experts and everyone involved in the arbitration administered by ITOTAM in any capacity 
whatsoever, shall be obliged to keep the arbitral proceedings confidential. Persons acting on behalf of the parties during the 
proceedings shall also be obliged to keep the arbitral proceedings confidential.’’ 
166 Emmanuel Gaillard; John Savage (edt.) Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (1st edn., KLI, 
1999), 692 
167 Redfern, Hunter, Pastarsides, Blackaby (n 97), 269 
168 The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provide that the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such a manner as it considers 
appropriate, Article 15. ICC Rules contain provisions to a similar effect in Art. 22.4. However, ICSID Arbitrations Rules do not 
contain such a general statement, but detailed provisions ensure equality of treatment ;and if any party fails to appear present his 
case, a special default procedure must be followed. ICSID Arbitration Rules, Art.2.7. ISTA Ethics Rules art. 5. 
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given proper notice to do so.170 Otherwise this would offend against the right to equal treatment.171 For 
instance, The English appeal court stated that an arbitrator make an award against a party without 
having heard representation on its behalf, it is a breach of natural justice and misconduct for the purpose 
of the Arbitration Act 1950 and The Court stated that not only must the award be set aside, but the 
arbitrator ought to be removed from further conduct of the proceedings.172   
However, parties will communicate with the prospective arbitrators, seeking to sound them out as to 
their qualifications and availability and as to selection of an appropriate presiding member in a multi-
member tribunal. 173This is a general rule that is also subject to arbitral rules that specifically provide for 
ex-parte communications and many institutional rules as well as the IBA/ AAA codes of arbitrator ethics 
forbid ex parte contracts.174 When an institution is involved, parties will communicate via the institution 
in commencing the arbitration and formally selecting the tribunal.175 This rule is subject to three explicitly 
defined and accepted exceptions; firstly, the arbitrator might communicate with a party concerning 
administrative issues176, such as setting dates and times for hearings, if each party is informed of the 
communication and consulted in the determinations;177 secondly, if a party with due notice fails to attend 
a hearing, the arbitrator might proceed with the case with the party that is present;178thirdly an arbitrator 
may discuss the case with one party if the parties request or consent to the discussion.179 Moreover, 
provide that an arbitrator communicates in writing with a party, or receives written communication from 
a party, the arbitrator must provide the other party with a copy of the communication.180 Where an 
arbitrator received a letter from a claimant but did not communicate this to a respondent, enforcement 
has been refused in this case.181 Where an arbitrator conducted a meeting with one party alone but 
                                                          
170 AAA Canon II(E) (2004); IBA R. 5.3 (1987). 
171  Doak Bishop, Margrete Stevens, ‘The Compelling Need for a Code of Ethics in International Arbitration: Transparency, 
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172 Modern Engineering v. Miskin [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 135,138 
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175 Born, International Arbitration: Law and Practice, 135 
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provided a verbatim transcript to the other side, LCIA Court considered it to be a failure to act fairly 
between the parties.182    
F. Duty to with due diligence 
The duty of an arbitral tribunal to act with due diligence may be regarded as akin to exercising 
reasonable care and skill. One of the parties’ objectives in agreeing to arbitrate is to obtain a speedy, 
efficient resolution of their dispute, therefore there is an obvious obligation upon arbitrator to carry out 
its task with due diligent. It is said; ‘ Justice delayed is justice denied’.183  
Although historically procedural obligations concentrated on due process, fairness, independence and 
impartiality, over the time concerns have been raised with expense and delay in many arbitrations.184 
Many ethical codes185 and some national laws impose express obligations on arbitrators to avoid 
unreasonable delay and expense, and a few sets of institutional rules or national laws endeavour to 
ensure that an arbitration is carried out with reasonable speed by setting a time limit for rendering an 
award.186 Thus this is can be said that arbitrators should carry out their duties in a timely manner187. 
Whether this requirement is met is determined by the sound discretion of the arbitrator. These time 
constraints, however, are constrained by some arbitral rules that actually set out the time limits. In 
addition, sometimes arbitration agreement specifies particular time deadline or timetables for the 
arbitration. This obligation involves the duty to decline a nomination if the arbitrator is not sure of his or 
her capacity to meet prescribed deadlines.188  
The duty of avoid any delay in the conduct of an arbitration should have a bearing at the appointment 
stage.189In addition, leading arbitral institutions have recognised the need to better ensure that 
arbitrators fully comply with their obligations of diligence and timeliness.190 Particularly, ICC has 
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establish a Task Force on minimizing costs and delay in ICC arbitrations.191 Also other leading arbitral 
institutions consider an arbitrator’s past record of timeliness in making future appointments.192  
G. Duty Not to Delegate Duties and Complete the Mandate 
The arbitrator should not delegate the responsibility to decide the case to another person, in other words, 
an arbitrator’s obligations include the duty not to delegate his or her responsibilities or tasks to a third 
party.193 Arbitrator’s essential  adjudicative functions such as the duty of deciding a case, attending 
hearings or deliberations, or evaluating the parties’ submissions and evidence to others are personal 
and non-delegable duties.194 In the Threlfall v. Fanshawe decision the arbitral tribunal commits that 
misconduct if it delegates decision to another.195 Nonetheless, to obtain a range of assistance in 
connection with the arbitral proceedings from third parties common for arbitrators. Arbitrators may use 
clerical assistance in order to typing and organizing files, dealing with administrative matters; these tasks 
may be conducted either by secretarial or similar stuff.196  
The primary obligation on an arbitrator is to make a final, binding, enforceable independent 
determination of a dispute which is described as ne ultra petita partium.197 Even though most national 
laws and institutional rules permit arbitrators to resign from their positions, either with or without the 
consent of national courts or arbitral institutions, an arbitrator’s duties include the duty to complete the 
mandate and provides limits on the power of an arbitrator to resign without good cause.198 Arbitrator’s 
acceptance of his or her appointment provides an implied undertaking so as to complete that 
mandate.199 Therefore, resignation evaluates as a breach of this undertaking.200  An arbitrator’s 
resignation would generally be justified due to material changes in personal circumstances beyond the 
arbitrator’s control, such as personal health or family problems requiring attention, incapacity, or conflicts 
of interest arising after commencement of the arbitration.201 An arbitrator may well also resign where 
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some fraudulent or otherwise improper behaviour of the parties becomes known after acceptance of the 
appointment and also may include a change in professional circumstances( such as accepting a 
government appointment or an in-house legal position, or joining a new law firm, giving rise to an 
inescapable conflict or similar issue) or developments affecting the arbitrator’s or the parties’ counsels’ 
law firm ( such as conflicts or similar advertise).202 The arbitrator’s resignation may well have 
considerably adverse consequences for the parties. In particular, where a sole arbitrator is concerned, 
resignation may well cause substantial delays and expense for the parties that may need to repeat their 
submissions and will wait for new arbitrator to read the case. In the light of resignations’ impact upon 
the parties, great care should be taken in invoking these grounds and should be discuss with the parties 
in advance, so alternative efforts should be undertaken to avoid the need for such a step.203 
II- THE RULE-ENFORCING FUNCTION OF ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS 
Parties are allowed to choose the arbitrators or to choose a method for their selection in virtually all 
modern legal systems.204 Party autonomy and consent have primary role in selection of arbitrators as 
with so many areas of international arbitration, the absence of agreement cannot be allowed to prevent 
or frustrate the arbitration.205 There is main differences regarding arrangements for the appointment of 
arbitrators in terms of whether there is to be one or three arbitrators and in any case it is necessary to 
ensure that there is fairness in the appointment process.206 
Therefore, arbitral institutions have a prominent role in the arbitrator appointment process. The role of 
arbitral institutions is particularly significant in the appointment process as well as in the control of 
arbitrators.207 It is a truism that "arbitration is only as good as its arbitrators"208 or, as Professor William 
W. "Rusty" Park expressed, "Just as in real estate the three key elements are 'location, location, 
location', so in arbitration the applicable trinity is 'arbitrator, arbitrator, arbitrator".209 
A. The Outcome-Determinative Role of Arbitral Institutions in the Appointment and Control of Arbitrators 
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a) The Outcome-Determinative Role of Arbitral Institutions in the Arbitrator-Appointment Process  
The fact that whether arbitral institutions should have greater control over the appointment of arbitrators 
or not has been a controversial issue over the years. Some commentators took the position that it would 
be better if parties ceased to make their own appointments and the arbitral institution should control how 
the tribunal is constituted while respecting parties' criteria. 210 However, this idea is criticized by some 
commentators as; it would be suicidal for any arbitration institution to deprive parties of their right to 
select or at least nominate at least one arbitrator in reality.211 Parties should continue to have a word in 
the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, at least on the international level. For example, any arbitrator who 
is nominated by the parties requires confirmation by the arbitral institution which is regularly controlled 
by the arbitral institution. 
 Arbitral institutions invariably have the power to appoint arbitrators under their own rules of arbitration 
and parties frequently agree to arbitrate in accordance with to institutional rules.212 Different institutions 
adopt different methods for appointing arbitrators. For instance, The ICC Articles 11 through 13 provide 
that where there is to be a sole arbitrator and the parties fail to nominate him or her within 30 days from 
the communication of the Request for arbitration to the other party, he or she will be appointed by the 
ICC Court of arbitration.213 
Even though arbitration is not to be conducted pursuant to institutions own rules, many of arbitral 
institutions are willing to offer their services as appointing authority.214 Compared with professional 
societies and trade associations, the advantage of arbitral institution’s involvement is their day-to-day 
involvement in and concern with international arbitration; they know what qualities to look for in the 
persons they nominate as arbitrators; and they maintain up-to-date records of persons who are active 
as arbitrators in international arbitrations.215    
(a) An Arbitral Institution's Duty to Share Knowledge Relevant for an Arbitrator's Information with the 
Parties  
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The parties who wanted their cases to proceed as quickly as possible generally undermined this aim by 
selecting a ‘top’ arbitrator without first inquiring whether he or she had time available to permit case to 
be brought to a rapid conclusion.216 Many arbitral institutions have responded to this issue particularly 
due to arbitration users complained about a real or perceived lack of time and cost efficiency in 
international arbitration.217 In 2009, the ICC Court started to require prospective arbitrators agreeing to 
serve in ICC arbitral proceedings to disclose details confirming their availability as well as their pending 
cases and218 to confirm that they can devote the time necessary to conduct the new arbitration diligently, 
efficiently and in accordance with the time limits stipulated in the ICC Rules of Arbitration.219 According 
to article 13(1) of  2017  ICC Arbitration Rules, the ICC Court vaguely obliged to consider ‘the prospective 
arbitrator’s availability and ability to conduct the arbitration in accordance with the Rules’. Moreover, the 
ICC Court has decided not to confirm or appoint arbitrators because of their lack of availability.220 
In certain jurisdictions221, there is a tendency to appoint more or less exclusively elderly arbitrators since 
the fact that arbitrators are traditionally more mature in age is a delicate issue and international 
arbitration is dominated by relatively few grand old man.222 As Jan Paulsson quite remarks, ‘’ Individual 
reputations in this field grow only by the slow accretion of evidence of independence and fairmindedness 
in numerous instances when it really matters’’.223 Yet, with age not only experience and reputation but 
also a certain fragility and it would be unfair to accuse every elderly arbitrator or judge of not being able 
to diligently perform the given job since he or she has reached a certain age.224 It is generally recognized 
that ability to conduct an arbitration according to the Institutional Rules has various facets, such as 
expertise, experience, qualifications and language but not physical and mental fitness.225 On the 
contrary, Bond is stated that ‘’ Law is one of the blessed professions in which age is considered to impart 
wisdom. Nonetheless, where an arbitration will obviously be complex and lengthy, a party may wish to 
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try to determine whether the health of a potential co-arbitrator will allow him or her to function efficiently 
under conditions of stress, travel, etc.’’226   
Physical and mental fitness of arbitrator definitely be a criterion that parties who are interested in rapid 
and time efficient proceedings should consider, since some parties seeking to delay arbitration 
deliberately choose a busy or physically and mentally incapable of conducting the proceedings as 
required.227 In this case, it is a pivotal question whether the arbitral institution should have power to 
restrain the parties from select this arbitrator or replace the arbitrator who is selected by parties or not.228 
The fact that the arbitral institutions virtually have much more information about the suitability, availability 
and physical or mental fitness of a candidate for being appointed as arbitrator in addition to what the 
candidate discloses voluntarily.229 Thus, where an arbitrator candidate makes an incomplete disclosure 
regarding his or her relevant information, the arbitral institution should step in and insist that completes 
the statement of any relevant circumstances based on its own knowledge. Particularly in an arbitration 
that is involving a local and a foreign party (more relies on the arbitral institution to provide a level playing 
field by sharing its institutional knowledge with both parties).230 
In the Dustex231 case, a company tried to set aside an award by claiming that the presiding arbitrator 
,who had selected by American Arbitration Association, had serious hearing problems, fell asleep and 
was confused and that caused him to ignore numerous legal objections and miss witness testimony. 
The Court brushed off all the contentions about the alleged physical and mental deficiencies of the 
chairman and simply stated that ‘’ Dustex fails to articulate how its allegations actually prejudiced it to 
justify relief under the relevant section of the Arbitration Act’’. 
In another case232 the chairman of the arbitral tribunal was diagnosed with an inoperable brain tumour 
and never informed the parties of this diagnosed. In 2013, the arbitral tribunal issued a decision in favour 
of Team Tankers and in January 2014 he passed away. The other party of arbitration set aside the 
arbitral award by arguing that he failed to disclose his condition. However, the Court dismissed since 
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under limited grounds for challenge of an award under Arbitration Act there is no possibility but to try to 
equate non-disclosure of critical medical information with corruption.233  
(b) An Arbitral Tribunal Should Show No Cronyism in the Appointment Process Arbitral institution should 
be cautious to prevent cronyism where appoint the arbitrators, i.e. awarding lucrative arbitrator 
mandates to friends or trusted colleagues. In the worst case, an arbitral institution's appointing 
committee considers such power to appoint arbitrators as a kind of self service by reserving the most 
interesting and lucrative mandates for members of the appointment committee.234 In addition, following 
the call for more transparency in the appointment process of institutional arbitration, it is helpful provided 
an institution publishes the names of arbitrators on its homepage.235 
B. The Outcome-Determinative Role of Arbitral Institutions in the Control (and Sanctioning) of Arbitrators  
"Trust is good, but control is better" 
Arbitral institutions rule making function is prominent, however, their control compliance of their rules 
and particularly sanction intentional breaches of its rules is even more important.236  
(a) An Arbitral Institution Should Replace Arbitrators Who Are Unable or Unavailable to Perform Their 
Function  
What is the effect of the arbitrators having failed to fulfil their obligations or not to perform their function237 
properly? For instance, an arbitrator may well not to disclose all relevant facts that objectively could 
affect his or her independence or impartiality; he or she may well fail to adopt an appreciate procedure 
or delay the proceedings by sloppy case management; or in extreme case he or she may well act in bad 
faith.238In other words, circumstances such as misconduct of the proceedings or the inability of an 
arbitrator to fulfil his/her functions can cause that arbitrator to be revoked and replaced by the relevant 
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institution on its own initiative.239 The reasons for the lack of performance of the arbitrator are irrelevant, 
they can be de jure or de facto.240 
Generally, different institutional rules provide remedies dealing with those situations.241 Under various 
institutional rules, the aim of such provisions is to prevent an arbitrator's actions or special circumstances 
to delay or cause misconduct of the proceedings; irrespective of whether he/she is negligent or not.  
The normal remedy is the removal of arbitrator.242Violations of obligations of a judicial nature give rise 
to a right to have an arbitrator removed.243The violation of other duties such as the obligation of conduct 
the proceedings with the necessary care and diligence and to avoid undue delay, the same applies.244 
In the absence of  replacement by the parties, the relevant body of the institution (such as the Council 
or the Court) is entitled to replace the arbitrator after taking the opinions of the parties and the 
arbitrators.245 One of the pivotal question is the extent of the repetition of the arbitral proceedings after 
the removal and replacement of one of the arbitrators. The majority of institutional rules provide the 
discretion to decide on this issue to the newly appointed arbitral tribunal.246 Among the Turkish 
Institutions, none of them contain any provisions concerning this issue under their arbitration rules. 
TOBB Arbitration Rules article 22(3) states that replacing one or more arbitrators shall not stop the time 
limit for rendering an award. Nonetheless, this provision seems to be only about the continuation of the 
time limit and not does not give any information regarding the procedure to be followed that concern the 
repetition of the hearings in case of a replacement of an arbitrator.  
Many arbitral rules deal in more or less discrete manner with the physical and mental fitness of an 
arbitrator to serve in the envisaged arbitral proceedings.247 Article 13(1) of the ICC Arbitration Rules 
allows the ICC Court to refrain from confirming arbitrator candidates who are unfit or lack the ability to 
conduct the arbitration in accordance with the ICC Arbitration Rules, which strive for cost- and time-
efficient proceedings and to supplement these powers, Article 15(2) of the Rules allows the ICC Court 
to replace an unfit arbitrator on its own initiative when an arbitrator is prevented de jure or de facto from 
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fulfilling his or her functions or when an arbitrator simply fails to discharge his or her mandate248; ‘’ An 
arbitrator shall also be replaced on the Court’s own initiative when it decides that the arbitrator is 
prevented de jure or je facto from fulfilling those functions in accordance with the Rules or within the 
prescribed time limits.’’ 
According to The Secretariat’s Guide to ICC Arbitration, Article 15(2) gives the ICC Court ‘’ a power that 
enables it to fulfil one of its central functions: monitoring and policing the conduct of arbitrators’’. The 
application of Article 15(2) is also described as not being ‘’ a punishment for an arbitrator’s poor 
performance, but rather a practical solution to further the parties’ interests in a rapid and effective 
arbitration procedure’’.249  
The new LCIA Arbitration Rules deal with the issue of the fitness and availability of arbitrators in the 
most direct manner.250 According to Article 5.4 of the LCIA Arbitration Rules, a candidate is required to 
furnish an undertaking confirming that they are " whether the candidate is ready, willing and able to 
devote sufficient time, diligence and industry to ensure the expeditious and efficient conduct of the 
arbitration." This means that pursuant to LCIA Arbitration Rules, an arbitrator is obliged to review and 
disclose whether he or she is able to ensure time-efficient proceedings and assuming that such 
disclosure is made, allows the institution to intervene early enough to prevent the appointment of an 
unsuitable candidate. 
Moreover, the LCIA Arbitration Rules Art. 10.1 states that; ‘’ The LCIA Court may revoke any arbitrator’s 
appointment upon its own initiative, at the written request of all other members of the Arbitral Tribunal 
or upon a written challenge by any party if: (ii) that arbitrator falls seriously ill, refuses or becomes unable 
or unfit to act….’’. The LCIA Arbitration Rules provide regulatory safeguards that are able to overcome 
the ensuring problems. Therefore, the Rules seem to have fully identified the issue of the ailing arbitrator.     
The International Centre for Dispute Resolution Arbitration Rules 2014 in Article 14(4) provide that "An 
Administrator, on its own initiative, may remove an arbitrator for failing to perform his or her duties." The 
ICDR rules do not deal with arbitrators’ availability or fitness directly beyond the usual requirements of 
impartiality and independence. Nonetheless, Art. 13(1) requires arbitrators to ‘’ act in accordance with 
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the terms of the Notice of Appointment provided by the Administrator’’. Moreover, in accordance with 
Article 15(1), "if an arbitrator resigns, is incapable of performing the duties of an arbitrator, or is removed 
for any reason and the office becomes vacant, a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed...."  Even if the 
arbitrator is not necessarily of the same opinion, The ICDR Rules provide mechanisms for the 
replacement of the ‘’ ailing arbitrator’’ that is no longer capable of performing his or her duties. 
 (b) An Arbitral Institution Should Compensate Arbitrators in Light of Their Performance  
Arbitrators contract result in reciprocal rights and protection as well as obligations.251 One of the 
arbitrator principal right is right of remuneration. The arbitrator provides a private dispute resolution 
service for the parties according to agreed procedure and in exchange the arbitrator receives 
remuneration by way of fees.252 In calculating the arbitrator’s fee, virtually all institutional rules set forth 
varies methods being adopted.  
UNCITRAL Rules authorizes the arbitral tribunal to initially fix the amount of its fees and Rules go on to 
provide that the appointing authority may ‘comment’ on or ‘make any necessary adjustments’ to the 
arbitrator’s proposed decision regarding fees.253 In addition, Rules provide for a binding adjustment by 
the appointing authority where the proposed fee is inconsistent with Art. 41(1). Therefore, the power to 
make such adjustment to the arbitrator’s fee is exceptional and limited by the concept of an adjustment. 
Nevertheless, intended provide a meaningful check on arbitrator remuneration. 
 In the LCIA Rules, arbitral tribunal is allowed a substantial measure of influence over its remuneration. 
According to Art. 5(3), the LCIA’s Schedule of Arbitration Costs provides that the tribunal shall agree in 
writing upon the applicable fee rates in accordance with said Schedule.254 The arbitrators remain 
responsible for reporting the hours ,that they have worked, which then form the basis for the LCIA to fix 
arbitrators fees.255   
The 2017 ICC Rules take a slightly different approach since it is minimizing the role of the arbitrator and 
the parties in fixing fee. The ICC Rules provide that the ICC Court will fix the arbitrator fee according to 
a fee scale.256 Moreover, The ICC may consider several factors while setting the arbitrator fee such as 
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diligence and efficiency of arbitrator, time spent, rapidity of the proceeding, complexity of the dispute 
and timeliness of the submission of the draft award.257 Particularly, the ICC Rules contain strict time 
limits that arbitrators and parties must  comply with.  Indeed, arbitral tribunal is expected to render 
awards within six months from the drawing up of the Terms of Reference, or within the time limit fixed 
by the ICC Court for this purpose.258 For example, The Scottish Arbitrator, Mr.John D. Campbell Q.C. 
had promised submit a arbitration award by Chrismas 2005. However, he did not issue award until five 
years later. The Chartered Institute expell him after a disciplinary proceedings and brought disciplinary 
charges against him. He admitted that he disregard of professional standards.259 Where a membership 
in a specific institution is relevant for an arbitration practitioner, such a sanction may be quite efficient.      
This may be said that if the award is submitted after expiry of the relevant time, arbitral institutions may 
lower the arbitrator’s fees where all these institutional rules take into account, unless it is satisfied that 
the delay is attributable to factors beyond the arbitrators' control or to exceptional circumstances. As a 
consequence, arbitrators may well have a strong incentive to submit awards within the relevant time 
limit to avoid being penalized by a fee reduction. Obviously, this pecuniary incentive to submit awards 
in time, creates important peer pressure within the arbitral tribunal and the threat of lowered fees is may 
be a valuable tool to incentivize tardy or overly busy arbitrators to complete their task.  
(c) An Arbitral Institution's Power to Blacklist Misbehaving Arbitrators  
Where an arbitrator who has either grossly misbehaved or simply is not able to comply with his or her 
mandate, nothing prevents an arbitral institution from not confirming or appointing him or her.260 Such 
kind of "blacklisting" could be for a certain period of time. To illustrate, a certain arbitrator would not be 
appointed or confirmed for a two or five-year period, or for their lifetime.261 In Cofely v. Bingham case, a 
trend of repeat appointments by a party, coupled with evidence of partisan behaviour during the 
hearings, Hamblen, J. stated that apparent bias on the part of the arbitrator had been established. An 
important factor in the court’s decision was the fact that the appointing party maintained a ‘blacklist’ of 
arbitrators, which presumably comprised arbitrators who, in that party’s estimation, were unlikely to 
render a verdict favourable to it. Hamblen, J. said that the notion that an appointee could fall out of 
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favour with the appointing party depending on the anticipated outcome of the case at hand would be a 
matter of some import for any person whose income depended on appointments.262  
Clearly, where an arbitrator is convicted for bribery since his or her decision in institutional arbitration 
was mostly guided by bribes, he or she could reasonably be banned for his or her lifetime to act as 
arbitrator under the rules of this arbitral institution. Where an arbitrator was sentenced to jail263 because 
of misleading an arbitral institution, the fact that he or she is blacklisted by the same arbitral institution 
should also not come as a surprise (even beyond the time he or she serves in prison).  
Moreover, an arbitral institution could have power to publicize misbehaviour of arbitrators by making a 
public announcement of the name of a lazy, inapt arbitrator or otherwise misbehaving arbitrator on the 
arbitration institution's webpage or in its publications may be an efficient way to warn the prospective 
other users of such arbitrator's services and demonstrate to the public that this arbitral institution is 
enforcing the integrity of its proceedings.264 
CONCLUSION  
Arbitration is an ancient methodology for dispute solving particularly in commercial matters. International 
commercial arbitration institutions are independent bodies that provide supervisory services over the 
arbitral procedure and these institutions have their certain set of rules applicable to the arbitral procedure 
and some of the relationships between the parties. Moreover, during the last century, there is a 
tremendous improvement in the international commercial arbitration area, a good number of arbitration 
institutions have been constituted with different rules of their own to be applied to the arbitration 
procedure in cases where parties provides for that specific institution's supervision and the application 
of its rules in the arbitration agreement. 
                                                          
262 Cofely Ltd. v. Anthony Bingham and another, [2016] EWHC 260 (Comm). 
263 As an example, a Court in Malaysia has gone further than usual in convicting an arbitrator to prison for making a false statement 
of independence. A British arbitrator was sentenced to six months in prison for making a false declaration of independence. 
According to the Malaysian Court, the arbitrator misled the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitrator into appointing him as an 
arbitrator on the basis of a false statement of independence. The rules do not expressly state that the arbitrator must take a 
statement of independence. However, the rules provide at art.5 that an arbitrator may be challenged if circumstances exists that 
give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence or if the arbitrator does not possess any requisite 
qualification on which the parties have agreed. The Rules provide that the appointing authority shall have to secure the 
appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator.  Aceris Law LLC, ‘ Arbitrator Independence: Arbitrator Convicted to Prison 
for False Statement of Independence (acerislaw.com,2016) <https://www.acerislaw.com/arbitrator-independence-arbitrator-
convicted-prison-false-statement-independence//> (accesed in 18.08.2019) 
264 The Chinese Arbitration Association Taipei Rules art. 41 reads that; ‘’ in the event that arbitral tribunal fails tor ender its 
award after the agreed upon date… the CAA shall announce the names of the arbitrators in the Association’s publication.’’ 
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By virtue of arbitration is a form of adjudication that not only resolves the dispute between the parties 
who have selected this method of private adjudication but also serves the justice system, arbitrators are 
indisputably the most prominent element of arbitration. Arbitration proceedings may only be fair and 
equitable if carried out by impartial and independent arbitrators. Arbitrators are subject to various 
obligations and responsibilities before, during and after arbitration proceedings are concluded. Such 
obligations and responsibilities may result from the national laws that govern arbitration, any agreements 
between the parties or in the case of institutional arbitration, the applicable institutional rules. 
Nonetheless, the arbitrators’ obligations are not limited to those set forth by aforementioned rules. 
Arbitrators are also subject to particular ethical obligations. Due to the judicial nature of the service they 
provide by resolving disputes and the legally binding nature of the award they render, alike judges, 
arbitrators are required to possess a highly-developed sense of ethics. Furthermore, the parties should 
make specific inquiries to ensure that a prospective arbitrator is able to and willing to give sufficient 
commitment to the case regarding priority or time and the person that is asked will need information so 
as to answer such questions. In addition, the parties should not expect a prospective arbitrator to make 
a realistic assessment or whether or not he can give the case efficient commitment without he is given 
this information. Moreover, arbitrators have certain moral or ethical obligations.265     
Circumstances such as misconduct of the proceedings or the inability of an arbitrator to fulfil his/her 
functions can cause that arbitrator to be replaced by the relevant institution on its own initiative. The 
reasons for the lack of performance of the arbitrator are irrelevant, they can be de jure or de facto. The 
purpose of such provisions under various institutional rules is to prevent an arbitrator's actions or special 
circumstances to delay or cause misconduct of the proceedings; regardless whether he/she is negligent 
or not. In the absence of a challenge or revocation by the parties, the relevant body of the institution 
(such as the Council or the Court) is entitled to replace the arbitrator after taking the opinions of the 
parties and the arbitrators. 
As regards to Turkish system, Turkish courts, parties and law-makers have been somewhat sceptical 
and uninterested in international commercial arbitration for a long time. However, increasing the 
awareness and knowledge of international and domestic arbitration is a priority in Turkey which include 
close contact with bar associations for vocational training of attorneys on arbitration, attempts to unify 
                                                          
265 Redfern,Hunter, Pastarsides, Blackaby (n 97), 270 
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the Turkish Court of Appeal’s chambers reviewing appeals of challenges to arbitral awards and studies 
to unify the Turkish legislation on domestic and international arbitration for ease of reference and 
application, which are more or less in the same vein bur regulated under two different pieces of 
legislation. Law-makers have taken a significant step by enacting the Turkish International Arbitration 
Act of 2001. This can be seen by the numbers of applications the three different Turkish arbitration 
institutions have been receiving throughout the years266. In spite of their alleged flaws, the three different 
arbitration institutions of Turkey not only a considerably step in favour of arbitrations but also show great 
promise. 
As a consequence; arbitral institutions not only have the power but also have the duty to preserve the 
integrity of arbitral proceedings. These aim can be achieved by appropriate rule making and rule 
enforcement. Namely, an institution’s mission in the management of the proceedings is to provide 
maximum administrative and organizational support so that the arbitrators can effectively and efficiently 
perform their own critical function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
266 The statistics show that the ISTAC received 6% of the total number of applications for arbitration received from the 
commencement of its operations on 26 October 2015 to 31 December 2015. This number increased to 27% between 1 January 
2016 and 31 December 2016 and to 40% the following year, between 1 January 2017 and 31 December 2017. The rate of the 
applications received only in the first two months of 2018 was 27%. 
<.http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/03/04/istanbul-arbitration-centre/> 
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